On Ukraine
Back in July 2008, I was coming home one evening from the office. I was living in Moscow (Russia) at the time, and what was customary there (at the time) was to hop in any Lada that would stop when you raised your hand in the street, and it would then take you to said home. That’s just what I had done that day, and my driver turned out to be a large middle-aged Georgian guy with a rather thick accent and a somewhat jovial attitude.
As we were stuck in what was (then) absolutely ubiquitous in Moscow, i.e. a massive traffic jam, which happened to have us stopped right in front of the Kremlin next to the Moskva river, the radio that was playing in the background switched to the news and then-rising tensions between Russia and Georgia. For those who don’t fully remember, the issue concerned South Ossetia, a strategic region within Georgia (for economic, gas-related reasons, as is often the case there, plus the also customary local ethnic imbroglio). President Putin was essentially manoeuvring to take control over the region, which was already largely the case, while then-Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili did everything he could to shout back, with the help of Western allies he was quite friendly with.
My take on the situation was — even if you are right, which the Georgians were (this was after all sovereign soil), you’d better watch out how you talk to Putin when he has more tanks than you and they are sitting right next to your border. I was convinced that Saakashvili also had that in mind: after all, he was a brilliant Columbia-educated lawyer who spoke multiple languages (including French!), he just knew better. And I said as much to the driver:
— Surely Saakashvili knows not to pick a fight…
— Oh, I don’t know about that… Things are pretty bad at the moment…
— But not to the point of actual conflict, do you think?
— Actually, I think that the risk is high…
— Come on, the guy wouldn’t do that with Putin, he’s too smart…
— Well…
Turns he was not and I was (overly) optimistic. As we know, the Georgian “war” happened (I use quotation marks simply because it was pretty quick), Russia invaded South Ossetia and Mikheil Saakashvili doesn’t even hold a Georgian passport anymore: luckily, Ukraine took him over and he is now rebuilding his political profile over there. Which (subtly) brings me to Ukraine…
As everyone probably knows at this point, tensions between Russia and Ukraine are similar, if not worse, to that of Russian and Georgia in that fateful summer of 2008. And Putin already took over Crimea by force back in 2014, with more troops fighting it out in the Donbas region to this day, an area both close to the Russian border — and rich in natural resources. How convenient. The current situation is dire enough that Western countries, starting with the US, are quite vocally getting involved and warning against a possible incursion, with sometimes confusing talking points: a few days ago, President Biden explained that, while a “small” incursion by the Russians would foster discussions, it was a sizeable operation that the country truly and firmly condemned. Putin must have savoured that diplomatic gift…
Granted, Ukraine is not Georgia: for starters and quite strategically, it is located far closer to the European Union and therefore to key members of the Western block (if one could still call it that). That Union has actually been working for years on preparing for a possible inclusion of Ukraine into the group, a prospect Russia has adamantly fought from day one. The thing is — for Russia, the idea that Ukraine would not only be outside of its direct influence, let alone part of the (Western) European lot is simply inconceivable. Lest we forget, Kyiv once was the capital of Russia and the cultural and historical ties (albeit demonstrably complex) between the two countries make it so that Russia would simply not let go.
That brings us to today’s situation: both camps are holding their ground with strictly opposing claims — the US that Russia do not attack Ukraine in any way, shape or form, Russia that Ukraine stop all efforts towards a rapprochement with the European Union. As I am older and therefore less (overly) optimistic than I was back in 2008, I do not discard the possibility of an outright conflict between both countries, given how frontal the opposition between the two currently is. And there is a very strong chance that something significant will happen, if not with tanks, then through political and/or economic action. While there are many unknowns at this point, I nevertheless hold a few convictions on this issue:
Ukraine’s position as a fighting ground between Western countries and the Russian “block” is (sadly) here to stay. Much like Palestinians and Syrians are paying the price for a global geopolitical blockade, Ukrainians are increasingly caught in the middle of an international game that is currently impossible to stop.
Putin is not the kind of man who would have reservations over killing innocent civilians if he thought the (political) gain outweighed the cost. In other words, if war is the best logical option for Russia, war it will be. Human rights, morals and/or optics come later.
The problem may be elsewhere entirely. While Georgia was a fundamentally economic, i.e. logical scenario, Crimea was effectively a political ploy to please a nation otherwise engulfed in an economic crisis that weakened Putin’s stature in his home country. In other words, a diversion. And that is very possibly what is at play here as well: taking over Ukraine is not a sound economic or military goal for Russia, which has enough problems to handle as it is. Whether it is another attempt at federating Russian citizens around their president or a way to hide other actually strategic dealings, perhaps regarding China (or both), we will know soon enough.
For now, there is not much we can do, except pity the Ukrainians who now stand in the middle of a no man’s land through no fault of their own…